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Abstract I describe the program of analysis of expertise
known as ‘Studies of Expertise and Experience’, or ‘SEE’
and contrast it with certain philosophical approaches. SEE
differs from many approaches to expertise in that it takes
the degree of ‘esotericity’ of the expertise to be one of its
characteristics: esotericity is not a defining characteristic of
expertise. Thus, native language speaking is taken to be an
expertise along with gravitational wave physics. Expertise
is taken to be acquired by socialisation within expert
communities. Various methods of analysis are described.
Keywords Expertise  Studies of expertise and experience
(SEE)  Expertise space diagram  Three dimensions of
expertise  Interactional expertise  Imitation Games
1 Preamble
The Muenster meeting was intended to be interdisciplinary
hence this preamble. Is what I do here philosophy or
sociology? My preferred answer is that the question is
misconceived. I am not a trained philosopher but those
doing sociology degrees in the 1960 and 1970s in the UK
had quite a bit of philosophy in their course—ethics, phi-
losophy of science and philosophy of social science. So I
got a smattering and it was the part of the subject that,
along with sociology of knowledge, I found most inter-
esting. By the time I finished my degree I was ‘a Poppe-
rian’ but then events caused me to read Peter Winch’s little
book, published in 1958, The Idea of a Social Science.
Winch was a philosopher and his book was about the
implications of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy for sociol-
ogy.1 Its well known conclusion was that the deep ques-
tions of sociology were really ‘misbegotten epistemology’.
In 1968 I struggled with the book but after many readings I
began to get the idea, went back to the original Wittgen-
stein and found I could understand it quite easily from a
Winchian perspective, and my life changed. Nearly
everything I have done since has been inspired by what I
learned then, so philosophy is the foundation of pretty well
all my work.
What Winch argues, totally convincingly as I see it, is
that peoples’ actions and peoples’ concepts are two aspects
of the same thing. You cannot understand the actions
without the concepts and you cannot understand the con-
cepts without the actions. Around page 120 Winch explains
this in terms of the actions of surgeons in an operating
theatre and their relationship to the idea of ‘germ’. Inter
alia he invents the notion of scientific paradigm 4 years
before Kuhn’s ‘Structure…’ which was published in 1962.
What is less convincing is that this means sociology is
misbegotten epistemology because one could equally
conclude from the brilliant identification of actions and
concepts that epistemology was misbegotten sociology
(Winch on his head). The only reasonable conclusion is
that when one is doing one, one is also doing the other
(Winch on his side). That is why I think the question about
whether this paper is sociology or philosophy is miscon-
ceived. Let me add that what I think about Wittgenstein is
the same as what philosopher David Bloor thinks about
Wittgenstein, that I have written a book with a philosopher
(Martin Kusch) who also thinks the same way and, of the
roughly 60 papers that I have published over the last
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10 years, around 35 of them have been in philosophy
outlets—see my entries in the bibliography to get a sense of
these—so even I am not sure if I am more philosopher than
sociologist.2
But let me also add that though I consider all my work
has been inspired by philosophy and that much of it is as
much philosophical as sociological, I probably would not
do very well in a philosophy exam and some of what I do is
still very different to many of the things philosophers do.
Furthermore I use lots of tables and figures which
philosophers don’t. Thus, I was disappointed, but not
astonished, that after my presentation at the Muenster
meeting the first remark addressed to me was: ‘that’s all
very clever but what is it all for?’ The implication of this
remark being, I think, that the only proper method for
philosophy—the only method that is ‘for anything’—is
armchair investigation of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to be called ‘expertise’ or
someone to be called ‘an expert’. I have nothing against
armchair exploration since I do a lot of it and I believe that
in virtue of our being fully socialised members of our
society we already know a huge amount about those
societies and their concepts and actions (and this was the
basis of my hero Wittgenstein’s later work), but I think we
have to be constantly vigilant in case armchair intuitions
are misplaced. There is also nothing wrong with getting out
of the armchair and doing experiments and what are, in
regular academic parlance, referred to as ‘sociological’
investigations of one group of experts or another. I think, in
other words, that we must be careful that our loyalty to our
disciplines, and especially our loyalty to particular corners
of our disciplines, does not divert us from using any tool
that helps us learn about, in this case, expertise. Thus, it
seems to me that a large group of philosophers’ intuitions
point strongly to the idea that an expert is someone with
more true and justified beliefs than non-experts while the
intuitions of another, partially overlapping group of
philosophers, direct them to believe that an expert is
someone with hard-won esoteric skills or understandings.
But I think both of these intuitions are wrong and that a bit
of sociological-looking, thinking, and acting, along with
new kinds of philosophical thought encouraged by looking,
and acting, reveals them to be wrong; empirical examina-
tion of experts’ ways of being in the world can enliven and
refresh even philosophical thought. Our responsibility is
not just to analyse the intuitions that come to us in the
process of socialisation into our societies but, sometimes,
to change them.
2 Domains of Expertise
What I am going to describe here comes under the label of
‘Studies of Expertise and Experience’ or SEE. SEE has
been building for about 15 years.3 SEE starts with an
approach to expertise which is based on Winchian/
Wittgensteinian ideas. The approach takes it that there are
‘forms-of-life’ (cultures or paradigms) characterised by
certain ways of going on and ways of thinking and that
those who are fluent in these ways of going on and thinking
are experts in those domains.
To become an expert in some domain is a matter of
becoming embedded in the social life of the domain,
acquiring what is to a large extent, tacit knowledge, so as to
internalise the associated concepts and skilful actions to the
point of fluency. Figure 1 is a sketch of a form-of-life—
originally drawn to represent the author’s long-term
embedding in the society of gravitational wave (GW)
physicists—now a billion-dollar international project. It
shows members engaged in spoken discourse (the packets
of waves) and in actions such as building bits of gravita-
tional wave detectors, doing calculations and publishing
papers as represented by the hammers and anvils. Each one
is a specialist at some particular practical activity as shown
by the different numbers on the hammerers’ knapsacks,
while their specialist actions are coordinated via a common
set of concepts and a common spoken discourse—the
‘practice language’ of gravitational wave physics which is
the waves.
Notice that a similar diagram could be drawn for any
expertise. There is nothing here about whether the concepts
thus absorbed lead to true beliefs nor about whether the
forms-of-life, or domains of expertise, are esoteric or
ubiquitous. I can be an expert in astrology just as much as I
can be an expert in astronomy and I can be an expert in
speaking English just as much as I can be an expert in
linguistics. This means that these domains are found at
many scales and that smaller ones are embedded in larger
ones.
3 The Fractal Model
Figure 2 represents what we call the ‘fractal model’ of
expertises. The term is meant to indicate that the same kind
of basic structure and analysis applies to expertises at all
levels. The top level of Fig. 2 might represent GW physics
in which case the second level down might be the form-of-
life of interferometer-builders and the third level the form-
2 See Bloor (1976/1991, 1983) and Collins and Kusch (1998).
3 Rather than putting SEE references throughout the text I will locate
them in a short ‘‘Bibliographical Appendix’’ at the end which can be
used by those who want to explore the topic further.
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of-life of interferometer-mirror suspension designers. But
there are levels above and the same diagram could repre-
sent English speakers at the top, scientists below and
physicists below that, with GW physicists further down
still below the frame. Furthermore, if we suppose the top
level is physicists, then group 1 might be Christians and
group 2 might be Hindus with special types of Christian
and Hindu physicists below them and so on; the problem is
that forms-of-life cross-cut each other.
The overall position adopted by SEE is that the way to
understand us is to see us as a collection of forms-of-life:
the atom is the collectivity, the individual is the molecule
constructed from many collectivities as in Fig. 3.
Here the largest shape might represent, say, native
English speakers with the smaller shapes representing GW
physicists, cricketers, Christians and so on. Of course, there
is a similar diagram for native French speakers so the
whole thing is multi-dimensional but even if we cannot
draw it, or even quite grasp its complexity, it gives us a
way of thinking about individuals’ expertises and compe-
tences being a matter of embedding in forms-of-life even
though the domains are intricately interwoven at many
different scales and across many dimensions.
4 The Three Dimensional Model of Expertise
As can be seen a crucial difference between SEE and many
models of expertise is its indifference to scale and therefore
ubiquity of expertise. In contrast to many philosophical and
psychological models, SEE takes the ‘esotericity’ of an
expertise to be a contingent matter rather than an essential
property. Stage theories of expertise such as those of,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, or Chi, correctly describe some
expertises but not others. This is because some expertises
do not always pass through the standard stages (think of
learning to balance on a bike or learning to articulate
‘tongue-twisters’) and because sometimes the stages are
integral with growing out of infancy.4 The 10,000 hours of
self-conscious practice model does not always work for
similar reasons. Most fatal of all for the idea that expertise
is necessarily esoteric is that the same expertise can be
esoteric at one time or place and ubiquitous at another.
Thus, fluent English speaking is not-counted as an exper-
tise in England but is a valuable skill in France while car-
driving and word-processing were esoteric skills when cars
and desk-top computers were first developed but are now
widespread. The greatest damage caused by the ‘essentially
esoteric’ view of expertise has arisen from mistaking
ubiquitous expertises, such as native fluency in a language,
as not really expertises at all because everyone possesses
them. Thus did at least one set of ludicrous misunder-
standings of the power of computers come into being, a
misunderstanding that is still present in science fiction
representations of robots where fluent speech is never a
problem even though in the real world of computing fluent
speech is a distant dream.
Understanding of expertise as essentially orthogonal to
its ‘esotericity’ along with the SEE model of the acquisi-
tion of an expertise enables us to construct a three
dimensional model of expertise—an ‘Expertise Space
Diagram’—as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 1 A form-of-life such as
that of gravitational wave
physicists
4 The psychologist Chi (2006) says that individuals go through six
stages of increasing sophistication as they become expert while the
philosophers, Stuart and Hubert Dreyfus (1986), have a very
influential ‘five stage model’ of the development of expertise.
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The front-to-back ‘Z-axis’ represents the usual philo-
sophical or psychological ways of thinking about exper-
tise—a matter of increasing individual accomplishment
that may pass through certain definable stages. To this we
can now add the, left-to-right, X-axis, which represents the
extent to which an individual has access to the tacit
knowledge of the domain in question such that he or she
can gain fluency. Figure 1 shows one stick figure—the one
toward the top left—who has no number indicating a
practical specialism. We can think of this figure as a novice
who is entering the field and has only started to acquire the
language and the practical abilities and so has not yet
developed into a specialist. If the novice is to succeed they
must have good access to the tacit knowledge and will
move to the right as they gain it. The, vertical, ‘Y-axis’
represents the esotericity of the domain, native English
speaking being low down in English-speaking countries,
GW physics being high in all known countries, though one
can just about imagine a society where gravitational wave
physics was taught from the cradle and in which it would
be a ubiquitous expertise.
The expertise space diagram can be used in a number of
ways. Figure 5 shows ‘surfaces’, in this case representing
car driving. The top surface is represents racing-driving, an
esoteric expertise. The back left hand void in these surfaces
results from the impossibility of going far on the Z-axis
without going far on the X-axis—i.e. acquiring tacit
knowledge. There may be some skills where it is all, or
nearly all, a matter of explication but they are hard to think
of. The front right hand void is there because if a novice
sticks around for a long time without starting to learn
things—backward movement on the Z-axis—he or she is
likely to be excluded from the company of experts. I guess
the first of these voids is, roughly, philosophical and the
second one is, roughly, sociological, but I must admit they
both come from armchair consideration, though one based
Fig. 2 The fractal model
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on lots of experience. The top surface could also represent
car-driving when horseless carriages were first invented.
The lowest surface represents ordinary driving in Western
societies where the expertise is nearly ubiquitous. The
middle surface can be an in-between position in time, in
specialist driving skill (e.g. lorry-driving) or represent
some location where there are few cars—some developing
society.
Figure 6 shows educational trajectories. The left of
these two is kindergarten where infants are being taught to
acquire a range of skills—language, proper social interac-
tion etc.—that are ubiquitous in the society in question.
The rightmost of the two diagrams represents university
education—distance learning, normal face-to-face degrees
with more acquisition of tacit knowledge and Ph.D., which
involves quite a bit more tacit knowledge.
5 The Periodic Table and Interactional Expertise
The Periodic Table of Expertises (Fig. 7) is an attempt to
list, exhaustively, all the types of expertise there are that
can bear upon questions of technological decision-making
in the public domain, from ubiquitous to specialist exper-
tise. We also include meta-criteria—the qualities of experts
that members of the public might take into account in
deciding whose view to trust but we consider these are not
of great importance. More important is general social
knowledge of in what sections of society to place trust in
respect of technological matters: in general, if you want to
know about stars, place trust in astronomers rather than
astrologers, and so forth.5 This kind of understanding is
found in the meta-expertise line: meta-expertise is exper-
tise about experts. For example, ‘local discrimination’ is
important for ‘whistleblowers’. Of particular importance is
the division between Primary Source Knowledge and the
rightmost entries in the specialist expertise row which refer
to what are normally thought of as experts. Primary Source
Knowledge is information obtained by those with only
ubiquitous tacit knowledge (fluency in the language, gen-
eral education up to and including university level and an
understanding of libraries and other sources) who persevere
with reading the professional journals. We show that the
meaning of a published paper cannot be understood
Fig. 3 The individual as a collection of collectivities
 
Exposure to tacit knowledge of domain 
Esotericity 
Individual or group 
accomplishment 
Fig. 4 Three dimensional model of expertise
Exposure to tacit knowledge of domain
Esotericity
Fig. 5 The expertise space diagram and car-driving
5 Goldman (2001), deals with similar problems though our reading of
his work is that he is more concerned with what we call ‘meta-
criteria’ than with more general meta-expertise. For an alternative
treatment see Collins (2014).
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without understanding its location in the social milieu of
the relevant technical domain. Thus there are published
papers that are indistinguishable from all the others in a
journal yet which the professionals in the domain simply
ignore. The public have no chance of understanding this
and that is one reason why obtaining knowledge from the
internet without further back-up is unreliable. The table has
been explained at length elsewhere (see ‘‘Bibliographical
Appendix’’) so here I concentrate on its most novel and
contentious component, ‘interactional expertise’.
6 Interactional Expertise
As can be seen, interactional expertise is one of two kinds
of specialist expertise that depend on possession of the tacit
knowledge of the specialist domain. The other,
‘contributory expertise’ is what we normally mean when
we talk of experts—these are people who exercise their
expertise by contributing to their specialist domain.
Interactional expertise can be understood by referring
back to Fig. 1 and the stick figure at the top left who we
have already used to represent a novice entering the field
and beginning to acquire both the spoken discourse (the
wavy lines) and one or other practices (a hammer and
anvil) pertaining to the domain. Figure 8 is the same as
Fig. 1 except that here we introduce an additional stick
figure, roughly bottom central, who has no hammer and
anvil but acquires only the spoken discourse of the domain.
Such a person is an interactional expert. The competences
of such a person are represented by someone like Collins
who has embedded himself in the domain of GW physics
for more than 40 years with an especially intense 10 years
of interaction from the mid-1990s during which he
Fig. 6 The expertise space
diagram and educational
trajectories
1 UBIQUITOUS EXPERTISES
2
DISPOSITIONS
Interactive Ability 
Reflective Ability
3 
SPECIALIST
EXPERTISES
UBIQUITOUS
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
SPECIALIST 
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
Beer-mat
Knowledge
Popular
Understanding
Primary 
Source
Knowledge
Interactional
Expertise
Contributory
Expertise
Polimorphic
Mimeomorphic
4
META-
EXPERTISES
EXTERNAL
(Transmuted expertises)
INTERNAL
(Non-transmuted expertises)
Ubiquitous
Discrimination
Local 
Discrimination
Technical
Connoisseurship
Downward
Discrimination
Referred
Expertise
5  META-
CRITERIA Credentials Experience Track-Record
Fig. 7 The periodic table of expertises
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travelled to most GW conferences held around the world
and continually emailed to friends and acquaintances in the
field. By the late 1990s Collins found he could speak flu-
ently and technically to GW physicists about GW physics
even though he had never actually done any GW physics in
the sense of building apparatus, doing calculations or
otherwise contributing to the theory or helping to write
papers for publication. He had become an interactional
expert, or as we would now say, a ‘special interactional
expert’ since we now believe that all contributory experts
must be interactional experts in order to learn their craft.
This idea immediately raises a number of questions.
What kind of expertise is this? How is it possible for
someone to acquire expertise in a domain without fully
engaging with it? There is now a considerable literature
debating these points but here I will try to provide some
simple answers.
This kind of expertise is more than ‘talking the talk’
while not being able to ‘walk the walk’ because it is a kind
of expertise that enables one to make sound technical
judgments that pertain to the domain: it is best thought of as
‘walking the talk’. A little more thought reveals that this is
the main component of the expertise possessed by the
managers of such large scale projects since they have make
decisions about which technologies to pursue that will be
worthy of the respect of the scientists and technologists they
manage but, generally, without making day-to-day techni-
cal contributions to the field they are managing. A little
more thought than that reveals that it is an expertise that is
used in peer review where the reviewer will rarely have
practised the practices whose worth is being judge. The
same applies to committee meetings judging technical
issues. And along with this is the observation that com-
mittee meetings that make technical decisions (for example,
those which Collins observed taking place in GW physics
including high-level meetings at the US National Science
Foundation) do not involve calculations and experiments,
they involve talk which, at best, reports the overall outcome
of calculations and experiments—very much within the
compass of the purely interactional expert (but one has to
attend the meetings to see this happening). Still more
thought reveals that it is the kind of expertise without which
the division of labour between specialists in a domain like
GW physics would be impossible because each specialist
learns to execute only one or two narrow practical spe-
cialties but must coordinate their work in those specialties
with that of all the other specialists and this is done by
discourse: the wavy lines are common to everyone, the
hammers and anvils are not. And this, in turn, explains how
it is possible for an outsider who is not fully engaged with a
specialist domain to acquire expertise in that domain; it is
because the only difference between the outsider and the
novice is that the outsider isn’t given one of the numbered
hammers and anvils to work with. The novice, note, is given
only one hammer and anvil, not all of them, so the very
notion of there being a practice pertaining to the field is
misplaced—there are many practices of which novices
learn only one so the outsider is not much worse off than the
novice. But do note that acquiring interactional expertise is
a long and hard process. (Is this sociology or philosophy? It
arises out of hanging around with GW physicists and almost
certainly would not have arisen without this social experi-
ence beyond the armchair. On the other hand, the last
paragraph is mostly a matter of thinking about things.)
Fig. 8 An interactional expert
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The notion of interactional expertise is, of course, a
departure from SEE’s Wittgensteinian/Winchian starting
point as it separates what can be learned from spoken
discourse alone from what can be learned from the mixture
of language and practice that constitute a form-of-life—we
call this the ‘separation principle’. Working from the pre-
cepts of SEE also leads to the conclusion that the notion of
interactional expertise is fundamental to an understanding
of the workings of society. For societies as a whole to work
as they do, people must coordinate their actions just as they
do in the specialist domain of GW physics. Since indi-
viduals cannot each practice each other’s practices, mutual
understanding and coordination comes through interac-
tional expertise making language, as though we did not
already know it, central to human social life and quite
different to animal life.6 It also makes the philosophically
fashionable emphasis on practice as opposed to language
wrong-headed—a conceit that seems to have arisen out of
treating language as a formal set of propositions rather than
a linguistic practice as heavily invested with tacit knowl-
edge as any other practice.
7 Imitation Games
Now we move to something that is hard to call philoso-
phy—experimental tests. What we have done is to adapt
the famous Turing Test. In the Turing Test a hidden
computer and a hidden person are questioned by ‘judge’
and if the judge can’t tell which is which we say the
computer is ‘intelligent’. There is a lot of complexity
underlying that innocent description but here let us simply
note that Turing based the test on the imitation game, in
which a concealed man pretended to a woman (or vice
versa) while a judge asked question of him and a concealed
woman and tried to tell the difference. We can say that if
the man passed the test then it indicated the possession of
interactional expertise in femaleness; femaleness was the
target expertise (Fig. 9).
Collins, who claimed he had interactional expertise in
GW physics took such a test. A contributory expert in GW
physics asked him seven technical questions about GW
physics via email with a ‘postman’ as the conduit for all the
mailings so that addresses/identities were hidden. The same
questions went to another contributory expert in GW
physics. Mathematical questions were banned. Both par-
ticipants returned their answers and the completed dia-
logues were then sent to nine other contributory experts in
GW physics to judge who was who—they all knew that
one of the participants was Collins. Seven said they could
not tell who was who and the remaining two thought that
Collins was the contributory expert. Figure 10 shows four
of the questions and answers.7
We also did experiments on the colour-blind, those with
perfect pitch and the blind. These experiments used small
numbers of participants rather than a single individual. We
wanted to test the theory of interactional expertise assuming
that those who spent most time immersed in the linguistic
discourse of the complementary group would be better at
passing as members of that group. Thus, we compared the
ability of the blind to pass as sighted with the ability of the
sighted to pass as blind, the blind spending all their lives
talking to the sighted whereas the sighted don’t spend much
time talking to the blind. As hypothesised, the blind did
better at passing as sighted than the sighted at passing as
blind, the difference being striking—86 %:13 %. Readers
will be able to work out who succeeded best when it comes
to the colour-blind versus the colour-perceiving and the
‘pitch-blind’ versus pitch perceiving.
The Imitation Game (we use capitalisation to indicate
the research tool), has now been developed so it can be
played on a large scale combining it with the idea of the
social survey. This is certainly an activity distant from
philosophy. Thus we play 200 or so games in various
countries to indicate such things as the level of under-
standing of minorities by mainstream populations taking
high pass rates in IGs to indicate good understandings. The
topics are such as religion and sexuality. We have also
found that in South Africa whites understand blacks much
better than blacks understand whites and are working on
why this is the case since the opposite was argued to be the
case in the US. It may be something to do with changing
power relations.
8 Interactional Expertise and Embodiment
The experiments on the blind, colour-blind and so forth
support the theory of interactional expertise and go a little
way to supporting what we call the ‘strong interactional
hypothesis—a ‘bold conjecture’, as Popper would call it—
which claims that ‘a person with maximal interactional
expertise would be indistinguishable from a person with
contributory expertise in any test involving linguistic dis-
course alone’. We provide as an example of the implica-
tions of the bold conjecture:
Imagine a person who has been blind and confined to
a wheelchair from birth. The claim is that such a
person could acquire a practical understanding of
6 That chimps and dolphins might possess vestigial languages makes
no difference to the argument.
7 The event and result was published as a news story in Nature (Giles
2006). An updated version of the test is reported in Chapter 14 of
Collins (2017).
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tennis solely from extended and intensive discussion
of tennis in the company of tennis players without
watching tennis or stirring from their wheelchair;
such a person could, in principle, understand tennis as
well as someone who had played it all their lives.
A bold conjecture does not have to be true to guide further
thinking and research. Thus this example has led to it being
pointed out that certain congenital limitations affect the
early development of the brain—feral children can never
learn to speak fluently because the relevant part of their
brain has not been developed in infancy—and so there
might be aspects of tennis that could not be understood by
someone who had certain limitations from birth not
because they had no exposure to tennis but because their
brain may not have had the opportunity to develop fully.
This intimates that claims about interactional expertise
should be limited to those who have not or cannot engage
in certain practices from early in life rather than from birth.
These experiments and thoughts lead one to notice a
crucial distinction that seems absent from the philosophical
literature that deals with the importance of the body to the
development of conceptual life. Our Wittgensteinian/
Winchian starting point, of course, leads us to understand
the development of forms-of-life as resting on the intimate
relationship of concepts/language and practices whereas
the ‘separation principle’ pulls them apart. How is this
tension reconciled? The answer is that at the collective
level language and practice are inextricable but they can be
pulled apart for individuals. There could be no tennis
language for the wheelchair bound to learn if members of
the tennis collectivity did not play tennis but the individual
PRETENDER 
pretends to 
have target 
expertise
JUDGE/
INTERROGATOR
has target expertise
NON-
PRETENDER 
has target 
expertise
Fig. 9 The basic imitation game
Q2) Is a spherical resonant mass detector equally sensitive to radiation from all over the sky?
A2)Yes, unlike cylindrical bar detectors which are most sensitive to gravitational radiation coming from a direction 
perpendicular to the long axis.
B2) Yes it is.
Q3) State if after a burst of gravitational waves pass by, a bar antenna continues to ring and mirrors of an 
interferometer continue to oscillate from their mean positions? (only motion in the relevant frequency range 
is important).
A3)Bars will continue to ring, but the mirrors in the interferometer will not continue to oscillate.
B3) Bars continue to ring; the separation of interferometer mirrors, however, follows the pattern of the wave in real 
time.
Q5) A theorist tells you that she has come up with a theory in which a circular ring of particles are displaced 
by GW so that the circular shape remains the same but the size oscillates about a mean size. Would it be 
possible to measure this effect using a laser interferometer?
A5) Yes, but you should analyse the sum of the strains in the two arms, rather than the difference.  In fact, you don't 
even need two arms of an interferometer to detect GWs, provided you can measure the round-trip light travel time 
along a single arm accurately enough to detect small changes in its length.
B5) It depends on the direction of the source.  There will be no detectable signal if the source lies anywhere on the 
plane which passes through the center station and bisects the angle of the two arms.    Otherwise there will be a 
signal, maximised when the source lies along one or other of the two arms.
Q6) Imagine that the end mirrors of an interferometer are equally but oppositely (electrically) charged. 
Could the result of a radio-wave incident on the interferometer be the same as that of a gravitational wave?
A6) In principle you could detect the passage of an electromagnetic (EM) wave, but the effect is different than for a 
GW.  The reason is that unlike EM waves, GWs produce quadrupolar deformations.  A typical EM wave would 
change the distance in only one arm while a typical GW wave would change the distances (in opposite ways) in 
both, so the differential signal for the EM wave would be half that for a GW.
B6) Since gravitational waves change the shape of spacetime and radio waves do not, the effect on an 
interferometer of radio waves can only be to mimic the effects of a gravitational wave, not reproduce them.  An EM 
wave could, however, produce noise which could be mistaken for a GW under the circumstances described.
Fig. 10 Imitation game with GW physics as the target expertise
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in the wheelchair can still learn to understand tennis from
the spoken discourse alone. There could be no GW physics
without all the specialists practising their specialties and
feeding their understandings into the discourse but the
spoken discourse can still be acquired by an individual
without that individual practising anything. To whatever
extent the embodiment thesis explains how we think col-
lectively it does not explain the individual acquisition of
collective understandings any more than the way the
English language has developed explains how I as an
individual learned English. And this is vital or we would
not be able to understand how those with serious physical
limitations are able to speak their native language fluently
(or, as has been mentioned earlier, how human societies
work).
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Appendix: SEE Publications
Here the description of publications follows the order of
the paper and some may appear more than once. I apolo-
gise for the Collins-centricity but, though a number of
authors are involved, the field is young enough for me to
have had a hand in most of the founding papers. A search
for the term ‘interactional expertise’ on Google will reveal
a flourishing secondary literature and citations to Collins
and Evans (2002) and (2007) together are approaching
3000.
SEE is first mentioned in Collins and Evans (2002), but
that paper is addressed to the science and technology
studies community; we attempt to persuade them to turn
their attention to the expertise of scientists so as to recap-
ture a sense of their special place in the social and cogni-
tive world. The ‘fractal model’ is set out in Collins (2011)
though it draws on Collins and Kusch (1998). For a large
book on the sociology and history of gravitational wave
detection see Collins (2004a).
The idea that expertise has three dimensions and the
expertise space diagram can be found in Collins (2013).
There I also try to reconcile sociology, philosophy and
psychology.
The Periodic Table of Expertises is explained at great
length in Collins and Evans (2007). A set of papers that
covers many aspects of this kind of expertise analysis can
be found in Collins (ed) (2007)—a special issue of Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science. That special issue
contains papers on expertise in management (Collins and
Sanders 2007) and on how the notion of interactional
expertise can be applied to interdisciplinarity (Collins et al.
2007). It also contains a paper on why removing mathe-
matics from the GW imitation game was not a problem
since mathematics is not central to every physicist though it
is central to physics as a whole (Collins 2007)—another
illustration of the difference between collectivities and
individuals.
Interactional expertise is first mentioned in Collins and
Evans (2002) but the idea is first worked out in depth in
Collins (2004b). That paper puts forward the idea that the
philosophical tension between language and practice is
there only because language has been treated as a set of
formal propositions rather than a practice in itself. The
paper draws on an earlier source discussing the idea of
interactional expertise before the term was invented,
namely Collins (1996), where it is introduced in the course
of a review of Hubert Dreyfus’s book, What Computers
Still Can’t Do. The concept is used there, and in some
subsequent articles, in a critique of Dreyfus’s view that
computers cannot be intelligent unless they have bodies.
For a paper that draws together the multiple streams that
feed into the idea of interactional expertise and some of the
places it is going, see Collins and Evans (2015). For a
paper on contributory expertise in the context of techno-
logical decision-making in the public domain see Collins
et al. (2016).
For an introduction to Imitation Games see Collins and
Evans (2014) and for a deep discussion of the large scale
game see Collins et al. forthcoming.
For interactional expertise and embodiment see also
Collins’s (2000), contribution of Dreyfus’s festschrift and
Selinger et al. (2007), which includes a contribution from
Dreyfus himself.
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